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Re´sume´
Ce travail pre´sente les re´sultats d’une enche`re expe´rimentale de vin. Les
participants de l’expe´rience ont e´te´ re´partis de fac¸on ale´atoire dans trois salles.
Dans chaque salle, quatre vins e´taient e´value´s, mais le niveau d’information
auquel les participants avaient acce`s diffe´rait d’une salle a` l’autre. Une fois les
e´valuations termine´es, les vins e´taient vendus se´quentiellement lors de quatre
enche`res Vickrey inde´pendantes avec prix de re´serve secrets. Nous trouvons
que certaines caracte´ristiques socio-e´conomiques comme le sexe, le revenu et
les habitudes de consommation, ont un effet significatif sur la disposition a`
payer pour un vin, alors que d’autres comme l’aˆge et la nationalite´ n’en ont pas.
Nous trouvons e´galement qu’une fois que les individus ont lu les caracte´ristiques
des e´tiquettes et qu’ils ont consulte´ les extraits de guides, le gouˆt des vins n’a
pas d’effet supple´mentaire sur la disposition a` payer. En revanche, si les indi-
vidus qui ont de´guste´ les vins a` l’aveugle sont informe´s des caracte´ristiques des
e´tiquettes et des appre´ciations des spe´cialistes, leur disposition a` payer augmente
substantiellement.
Abstract
This paper reports the results of an experimental wine auction. Participants
of the experiment were randomly assigned to three rooms. In each room four
wines had to be evaluated, but the level of information to which participants
had access differed across rooms. After the evaluations, the wines were sold
sequentially, by four separate Vickrey auctions with secret reservation prices.
We find that certain socio-economic characteristics such as gender, income and
consumption habits, have a significant impact on the willingness to pay for
wine, while others such as age and nationality, do not. We also find that once
individuals have read the label characteristics and extracts from wine guides,
the taste of the wines does not have an additional impact on willingness to pay.
Conversely, if individuals who have only tasted the wines blindly are informed
about the wine characteristics and opinions from experts, their willingness to
pay increases substantially.
Keywords: Auction; Field experiment; Information; Willingness to pay; Wine
price.
J.E.L. classification numbers: C93; D8; D44.
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1 Introduction
The willingness to pay for a consumption good depends, among other things, on
the degree of product-information that is available to the consumer. A consumer
that knows all the relevant product-characteristics will put a different value
on the good than a consumer that is for some reason only partially informed.
There are many situations in which it is important to learn how willingness to
pay is affected by the extent to which consumers are informed about a product.
For example, in launching a new food product, it is crucial for the producer
to know how potential buyers are influenced by package descriptions and the
taste of the product; for manufacturers of durable goods like cars or televisions,
it is important to know how potential buyers react to consumer reports and
different forms of publicity; before starting a campaign to inform the public on
an epidemic like BSE, it is important for the authorities to anticipate its effects
on beef consumption.
In this paper we establish empirically how the willingness to pay for wine
depends on the degree of wine-information that is available to the consumer.
Although a study of the link between willingness to pay and information could
be interesting for other types of consumption goods also, the issue appears par-
ticularly relevant in the case of wine. Note that field data, such as data from
wine sales at auction houses, would not enable us to estimate the impact of
information on the willingness to pay for wine. The data that auction houses
like Christie’s and Sotheby’s make public in their sales catalogues and auction-
eer’s books (see Ashenfelter (1989), Ginsburgh (1998), and McAfee and Vincent
(1993) for empirical analyses of these data sources) contain detailed descriptions
of the wines that were auctioned and the (winning) bids that were submitted,
but they reveal nothing about the level of information to which the bidders had
access. For the same reason, contingent valuation survey data would not be
very helpful either.
To obtain the necessary data, we therefore organized an experimental wine
auction. The auction took place during a scientific conference on oenometrics,
and the people (mainly economists, but also some medical doctors and special-
ists in marketing) that attended this conference were the actual participants of
the experiment. The participants were randomly assigned to three conference
rooms. In each room the experiment was made up of two parts: in the first part
the participants were required to evaluate four wines, and in the second part
these wines were sold by auction. The first part of the experiment was different
in the three rooms. Although the same four wines were evaluated in each room,
the type of information to which participants had access differed from room to
room. The participants in room 1 could see the labels on the wine bottles, they
could read extracts from influential wine guides and all sorts of technical details
about each wine, and they could taste the wines. Compared to room 1, the
participants in the other two rooms were partially informed. The participants
in room 2 could read the labels, the guide extracts and the technical details,
but they were not given the possibility to taste the wines. Inversely, the par-
ticipants in room 3 could taste the wines but could not read the labels, guide
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extracts and technical details. The second part of the experiment was identical
in the three rooms. Once the wines were evaluated in a room, they were sold
sequentially, i.e. one after the other, by four separate sealed-bid second-price
auctions (also known as Vickrey auctions) with secret reservation prices. After
each auction round the winner of the wine was announced, if there was one, but
the participants were not informed about any of the submitted bids nor about
the reservation price of the wine.
The data of this experiment are analyzed under the assumption that the
participants in a room had independent private values1 for a wine (but each
participant’s values could differ across the wines that were auctioned). As is well
known, in a standard single-object private-value Vickrey auction, the dominant
strategy for agents is to bid their private value for the object, i.e. it is optimal
for agents to bid their willingness to pay (this is precisely the reason why this
auction mechanism was chosen by us). As described above, we did not sell
one but several objects. We show that some additional assumptions are needed
to ensure that the participants submitted bids equal to their valuation for the
wines in this more general context as well. Given these assumptions and the fact
that the assignment of participants to rooms was randomized, it follows that for
each wine the effect of taste (resp. label characteristics and wine guides) on the
willingness to pay is identified by simply contrasting the distribution of bids in
room 1 with the distribution of bids in room 2 (resp. room 3).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the design
of the experiment. Section 3 shows under which conditions it is optimal for
bidders to bid their willingness to pay in sequential Vickrey auctions. Section
4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 The experiment
The experiment was conducted during the VI-th Oenometrics conference. This
two-day conference took place in October 1998 in Ajaccio, the largest city on the
French island of Corsica. Our experimental session was scheduled on the first
day of the conference, just after the keynote speech. After the keynote speaker
had finished his talk, one of us reminded the conference participants that an
experimental wine auction was about to take place. It was explained that those
willing to participate in the experiment had to draw a number from a box,
and that the number would randomly assign them to one out of three smaller
conference rooms. Each individual who actually drew a number was directed to
the selected conference room, and was seated at a table with his/her number
written on it. On each table there was a letter and an envelope containing all
material for the experiment. All individuals were required to read the letter
but not open the envelope. The letter informed them about the conditions
under which the experiment would be held. As the experimental conditions
were slightly different in the three rooms, the letters differed somewhat from
1Note that McAfee and Vincent (1993) also adopt the independent private value paradigm
in their theoretical explanation of the declining price anomaly observed in wine auction data.
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room to room. They can be found in the appendix.2 We asked individuals who
accepted the conditions and who wanted to participate in the experiment to
sign the letter.3 After all the letters were collected in a given room, the door
was closed and the experiment started.
The three experiments began more or less simultaneously. In each room
one of us was the experimenter. We were assisted by students from the Ecole
du Commerce et de la Distribution d’Ajaccio (two students in room 1, and
one in rooms 2 and 3). In each room we began the session by reading, aloud
and in English, an introduction: we welcomed the subjects, asked them not
to communicate or interact with each other, and told them to raise their hand
if at some point during the session they had a question; we then said that we
would start reading the instructions in English, and that they could find written
versions of the text, one in English and one in French, among the material
contained in their envelope. These instructions can be found in the appendix.
In each room we first asked the subjects to answer a number of questions
concerning their socio-economic characteristics (they were asked to fill in parts
A and B of the questionnaire; the questionnaire was identical in each room and
is given in the appendix). The session then proceeded with an evaluation of
four different wines. Although the same four wines were evaluated in the three
rooms, the type of evaluation differed from room to room. In room 1 the wines
were evaluated as follows. First the subjects were required to look carefully at
four wine description forms that were included in their envelopes. Each form
was numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4 and contained a photo of the label of the wine bottle
as well as some additional information concerning the product such as technical
details on production techniques and vinification methods, extracts from wine
guides, and publicity by the wine producer.4 Once the subjects had read the
wine descriptions, they were served four transparent and plastic cups, each one
filled with approximately 3 cl of wine. Each cup was numbered, again between 1
and 4. Subjects were told that there was a one-to-one correspondence between
cups and wine descriptions, i.e. the wine in say cup j corresponded to the wine
described in form j. We gave the subjects some bread and asked them to taste
the wines. After all subjects had finished tasting the wines (the majority of
subjects completely drank all their cups), we asked them to grade each product
in view of its description form and its taste. Each wine had to be graded on a
scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good), and all grades had to be reported
in part C of the questionnaire form. We told subjects that the questionnaires
would be collected, and advised them to copy their grades on a separate piece
of paper. We recommended the subjects to do this because we expected that
the grades could help them in determining the wine bids in the second part of
2Since the conference took place in France, and since many conference participants were
French, these letters and all the other documents used in the experiment were written in
English and in French. We only publish the English versions.
3It turned out that all persons who had drawn a number signed the letter. Hereafter these
persons will be referred to as the subjects.
4The four wine description forms are available upon request or can be found as an appendix
to the working paper 04-01 at http://www.inra.fr/ESR/UR/lea/document.htm.
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the experiment.
The subjects in room 2 had the opportunity to read the four descriptions
forms, but were not allowed to actually taste the wines.5 Here the subjects had
to evaluate the wines on the basis of wine descriptions only. The subjects in
room 3 had the opportunity to taste the wines, but did not get access to the wine
description forms. Here the wines were thus evaluated blindly. The subjects got
some bread, and here as well most of them drank all the wine. Similarly as in
room 1, the subjects in rooms 2 and 3 were asked to grade each wine on a 0-10
scale, and report all grades in part C of the questionnaire. Subjects were again
encouraged to copy the grades before we collected the questionnaire forms.
Once the four wines were evaluated in a given room we proceeded with
the wine auction. This second part of the experiment was completely identical
in each of the three rooms. We told subjects that the wines they had just
evaluated would be auctioned separately, first wine 1, then wine 2, etc..., and
that each wine would be sold per lot of six bottles at a Vickrey auction with a
secret reservation price fixed by us. We explained this auction mechanism and
illustrated it with two examples. We made sure that all subjects understood the
principle. The subjects were told that the winner had to pay the winning price
to us and that the wine bottles would be sent to her/his home address without
any additional charges. We told them that the secret reservation prices were
equal to the wholesale prices of the wines, and showed them four small envelopes
containing our reservation prices. The reservation prices remained secret during
the experiment, but we told subjects that they could, if they wished, consult
the envelopes at the end of the session.
Subjects could bid for a particular wine, by picking the appropriate small
envelope (there were four of them in the big envelope, each one numbered be-
tween 1 and 4), by indicating on the included piece of paper their bid, and by
reinserting the piece of paper in the small envelope. We explained them that
once all bids (for the wine that was to be auctioned) were submitted, we would
collect the corresponding envelopes and compare the bids. We told them that if
there was no winner, we would directly move on the next auction round, without
making public any of the submitted bids. If there was one, we would announce
the winner’s identification number, ask the winner to come to us and reveal
her/his name, and then continue with the next round, again without revealing
the submitted bids. In case the highest bid was submitted by two or more
subjects simultaneously, we would select the winner at random among these
subjects. It is important to stress that the bids were submitted and collected
separately. That is, in each auction round, the participants were requested to
bid only for the particular wine that was on sale in the auction round; similarly,
we only collected the envelopes corresponding to the wine that was sold during
the current auction round.
We finally gave the subjects five minutes to read the instructions on their
own, checked if there were questions, and when there were no longer any we
proceeded with the sale by auction of the wines.
5For fairness reasons they could, however, taste the wines at the end of the experiment.
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Thirty two individuals participated in the experiment: 10 of them were
randomly assigned to room 1, 11 to room 2, and 11 to room 3.6 Since 56
individuals were registered at the conference, this implies a participation rate of
57 %. After the experiment we talked with the non-participants, and it turned
out that they had various reasons for their refusal. Some non-participants had
objections of principle to auctions; others perceived auctions as something too
risky and were afraid of losing money; still others indicated that they had no
extra luggage space or mentioned that they lacked liquidity. Clearly, the last
group of individuals might have participated if we had told them before the
start of the experiment a) that the bottles were sent to their home address and
b) that it was not necessary to pay in cash.
Before turning to the next section, we comment on the products chosen for
this study. Unlike most experimental auction studies,7 we have chosen real prod-
ucts, and not artificial or fictitious ones. The disadvantage of this choice was
that it implied a loss of experimental control over certain economic variables.
For instance, we had no control over individual preferences like in laboratory
auctions (see for a survey Kagel, 1995). In laboratory auctions, the value of
an artificial good is typically represented by a random drawing from some dis-
tribution function, implying that individual preferences can be observed and
controlled by the experimenter. The obvious advantage of real goods over ar-
tificial ones was that they rendered the experiment more realistic and more
similar to field auctions.
The four wines selected for this study were all red wines. Wine 1 (Beaune
Bressandes) and wine 2 (Nuits Saint Georges) were Burgundy wines, wine 3
(Chaˆteau Berliquet) and wine 4 (Chaˆteau Haut-Marbuzet) are Bordeaux wines.
In October 1998, when the experiment was conducted, these wines were still
very young – wines 1, 2, and 3 were from the 1995 vintage, and wine 4 from
the 1996 vintage – and not yet mature. At that time it was thought that the
wines had a good ageing potential and that they had to be kept for a period
varying between 3 to 15 years before reaching their optimum. The four wines
were bought by us directly at the chaˆteau or at the domain. The prices per
lot of six bottles were FFr660, FFr570, FFr660, and FFr900 respectively. We
fixed the reservation prices per lot of six bottles at FFr600, FFr510, FFr600, and
FFr840 respectively. Since the purchase prices did not include the profit margin
usually added by retailers, and since we substracted FFr60 per lot of six bottles
for each wine, our reservation prices were reminiscent of wholesale prices. It
should be mentioned that whereas the Bordeaux wines could easily be found
on the market, the Burgundy wines could not because they were produced in
small quantities. After the wines were bought and sent to Ajaccio (for the wine
6Initially the box contained only thirty numbers: the first ten numbers for room1, the first
ten for room2, and the first ten for room3. When there were no more numbers left, i.e. when
thirty individuals had picked a number, the person who stood with the box discreetly put in
the next thirty numbers (the next ten numbers for room1, etc.). The purpose of this sampling
mechanism was to avoid a too unequal distribution of subjects among the three rooms.
7Lucking-Reiley (1999) is one of the exceptions we are aware of. He studied the revenue
equivalence theorem using data from auctions for collectible trading cards. His data were
generated in experiments conducted over the Internet.
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tastings we sent 6 bottles of each wine to Ajaccio), we realized that our two
Bordeaux wines were also included in the sample of wines used by Combris,
Lecocq and Visser (1997) to estimate a hedonic price equation for Bordeaux
wines. All the 541 wines in that sample were blindly evaluated and then graded
on a 0-20 scale by expert tasters. Chaˆteau Haut-Marbuzet received a 16.75 from
the experts, the second highest grade in the sample, and chaˆteau Berliquet a
12.25, which was slightly higher than the average grade in the sample (11.21).
3 Sequential Vickrey auctions
The models that are considered in the theoretical literature on multiple-object
sequential auctions do not fully capture all the specific features of our exper-
imental auction, so that the results and implications of this literature are not
directly applicable to our setting. Most models assume for instance that each
participant only wants one object, i.e. there is no utility associated with ob-
taining a second object (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994; Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
1994; Gale and Hausch, 1994; McAfee and Vincent, 1993; Weber, 1983). Since
the subjects in our experiment could in principle buy more than one type of
wine, this assumption is clearly too restrictive in our case. Some models do
allow the agents to have multiple-object demand functions (Black and de Meza,
1992; von der Fehr and Riis, 1999), but still do not reflect all aspects of our
experimental auction. Black and de Meza assume for instance that the objects
to be auctioned are strictly identical. Furthermore, their auction mechanism
differs from ours in that the winner of the first object has the option to buy the
other objects at the first-round winning price. Von der Fehr and Riis consider
sequential Vickrey auctions in which the objects are allowed to differ, but they
suppose that at the start of the first round agents do not know their valuations
for the objects sold in subsequent rounds (this assumption can clearly not hold
in our case since the subjects evaluated all wines before the start of the auc-
tions). Furthermore, they assume that there are no reservation prices, thereby
implicitly assuming that there is a winner in each auction round.
In this section we show what the optimal bidding strategies are in private-
value sequential Vickrey auctions, and under which conditions it is optimal for
bidders to bid their willingness to pay. For this purpose we consider a model
that draws on the model proposed by von der Fehr and Riis, but which differs in
two respects: we assume that at the start of the game agents know their private
values for all objects, and we incorporate secret reservation prices in the model.
Assume that there are just two risk-neutral players, indexed by i = A, B,
and two objects (denoted 1 and 2). The objects are allowed to be different
and are sold sequentially. At the start of the game, each player knows her/his
private valuations for the two objects, but not those of the other player. Let
v1i denote i’s valuation of the first object. Let v
2W
i denote the valuation of
the second object if agent i wins the first object and v2i if he/she does not.
We assume that the parameter δ ≡ v2Wi − v2i is the same for both agents and
is common knowledge. If the objects are substitutes then δ < 0; if they are
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complements then δ > 0. The valuations v1A and v
2
A (resp. v
1
B and v
2
B) are
allowed to be dependent variables. The pair of values (v1A, v
2
A) is independent
from the pair (v1B , v
2
B), and both pairs are drawn from the same, commonly
known, distribution function. The reservation prices for the two objects are
denoted p1 and p2. The prices are allowed to be dependent variables, but they
are assumed to be independent of the values v1i and v
2
i , i = A,B, and their
distribution function (as perceived by the players) is also common knowledge.
To determine the optimal strategy in this two-stage game, we proceed by
backward induction. In the second auction, the optimal bidding strategy of
each player is to submit a bid equal to its valuation (Vickrey, 1961), i.e. player
i submits either v2i or v
2
i + δ, depending on whether the player lost or won the
first auction round. Let us denote β(.) the symmetric increasing equilibrium
bidding function in the first auction. The equilibrium bidding function maps,
for each player i, the value v1i into a bid β(v
1
i ). Assume now that in the first
auction player B behaves according to this equilibrium strategy, so that player
B submits β(v1B). Then, if in the first auction player A submits bA, her/his
expected profit function is given by
pi(bA; v1A, v
2
A) =∫
bA>β(v1B)>p
1
{v1A−β(v1B)}+E[max(v2A+δ−v2B , 0)1{v2B > p2} | v1B , p1]dGv1B (v
1
B)dFp1(p
1)
+
∫
p1<bA<β(v1B)
E[max(v2A−v2B−δ, 0)1{v2B +δ > p2} | v1B , p1]dGv1B (v1B)dFp1(p1)
+
∫
p1>bA or p1>β(v1B)
E[max(v2A − v2B , 0)1{v2B > p2} | v1B , p1]dGv1B (v
1
B)dFp1(p
1)
where 1{.} is the indicator function, equal to one if its argument is true and
zero otherwise, E[.|.] denotes a conditional expectation, and Fp1(.) and Gv1B (.)
represent the marginal distribution functions of p1and v1B . The first term cor-
responds to the case where player A wins the first auction, the second term
to the case where player B wins the first auction, and the third term to the
case where neither player wins the first auction. Recall here that the object
was only sold if the second highest bid was above or equal to the reservation
price. Also recall that no information whatsoever was released between auction
rounds. However, this is not a crucial point since it can be shown that player’s
A strategy in the second round and expected profit function remain unchanged
in a situation where private values and the reservation price of the first object
are made public after the first round.
Deriving the expected profit function with respect to bA gives
∂
∂bA
pi(bA; v1A, v
2
A) =
∂β−1(bA)
∂bA
gv1B (β
−1(bA))Fp1(bA)(v1A − bA)
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+
∂β−1(bA)
∂bA
gv1B (β
−1(bA))E[max(v2A+δ−v2B , 0)1{bA > p1}1{v2B > p2}|β(v1B) = bA]
−∂β
−1(bA)
∂bA
gv1B (β
−1(bA))E[max(v2A−v2B−δ, 0)1{bA > p1}1{v2B+δ > p2}|β(v1B) = bA]
+fp1(bA)E[max(v2A − v2B − δ, 0)1{v2B + δ > p2}1{β(v1B) > bA}|p1 = bA]
−fp1(bA)E[max(v2A − v2B , 0)1{v2B > p2}1{β(v1B) > bA}|p1 = bA]
where fp1(.) and gv1B (.) are the density functions of p
1 and v1B . Replacing bA by
the equilibrium bid β(v1A), we find the following necessary condition for player
A to bid his willingness to pay in the first auction.
Proposition 1. In a sequential Vickrey auction with two objects and secret
reservation prices, a necessary condition such that the optimal bidding strategy
for player A is β(v1A) = v
1
A is:
gv1B (v
1
A)E[max(v
2
A + δ − v2B , 0)1{v1A > p1}1{v2B > p2}|v1B = v1A]
−gv1B (v
1
A)E[max(v
2
A − v2B − δ, 0)1{v1A > p1}1{v2B + δ > p2}|v1B = v1A]
+fp1(v1A)E[max(v
2
A − v2B − δ, 0)1{v2B + δ > p2}1{v1B > v1A}|p1 = v1A]
−fp1(v1A)E[max(v2A − v2B , 0)1{v2B > p2}1{v1B > v1A}|p1 = v1A] = 0.
Of course a similar condition holds for agent B to play β(v1B) = v
1
B . If
δ = 0 and if the second order conditions are verified, then it is clear that
β(v1A) = v
1
A and β(v
1
B) = v
1
B . That is, if the two objects are neither complements
nor substitutes, the players’ valuations (and hence bids) for the second object
are not affected by the results of the first auction, and it is optimal for both
players to bid their willlingness to pay in the first auction. Since the hypothesis
δ = 0 may well be unrealistic in our experimental study, the question arises
whether the necessary condition of Proposition 1 also holds in cases where δ 6= 0.
Since it appears impossible (even after choosing specific distributions functions
for the random variables in our model) to derive an explicit solution for the
optimal strategy β(.), we answer this question via a Monte Carlo experiment.
We simulated valuations by assuming that v1B and v
2
B are distributed as log-
normal variates with means, standard errors and correlation coeficient equal
to what is observed in our total sample (for wines 1 and 2). The valuations
for wines 1 and 2 of player A are equal to means of the bids (for wines 1 and
2). The reservation prices p1 and p2 are also simulated using the log-normal
distribution: here the means are equal to the true reservation prices of wine 1
and 2 (see section 2), and the standard errors and correlation coefficient are the
same as those chosen for the distribution of (v1B , v
2
B). Two main results are to
be drawn from this exercise. First, the condition of Proposition 1 is indeed
verified for a very large range of values for δ. Thus, at least for the valuations
of A that we have chosen in the simulations, there were many values for δ
compatible with the first order condition of Proposition 1. Second, few bids
were above the reservation prices fixed by us, i.e. few objects were actually sold
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in our Monte Carlo study. We shall return to this second finding in the next
section.
Before turning to the empirical results, it should be mentioned that our sim-
plifying assumption regarding the number of players can be weakened without
altering the main conclusions of this section in a fundamental way. The hypoth-
esis that δ is the same for all agents can also be dropped, the only consequence
would be that the equilibrium strategies are no longer symmetric. Generalizing
the model to the case of k > 2 sequential auctions seems the most difficult
extension. But even in this more complicated case it seems likely that there
exist conditions (analogous to the conditions in Proposition 1) under which it
is optimal for all bidders to bid their private values in all auctions.
4 Results
Some summary statistics for the socio-economic variables are given in Table 1.8
The indicator variables Nationality, Income, and Consumption were created by
grouping the observed answers to questions 2, 5 and 7 into two classes. Question
6 is not exploited since all subjects responded they drank red wine.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 2 we report summary statistics for the wine grades. From the last
column it can be seen that in the sample as a whole the wine with the highest
average score was wine 4, while the wine with the lowest average score was wine
1. Looking at the results per room, we see that in room 1 wine 3 was the wine
with the highest average grade, while in rooms 2 and 3 it was wine 4; the wine
with the lowest average grade was wine 1 in room 1, wine 3 in room 2, and wine
2 in room 3. The lowest grade assigned by the subjects was 2. This grade was
one time assigned in room 1 (to wine 1), and three times in room 3 (once to
wine 1 and twice to wine 2). The highest grade was 10, the highest possible
score. It was assigned two times in room 1 (once to wine 3 and once to wine 4),
and two times in room 2 (to wine 4).
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the bids. From the last column it can
be seen that on average the bids were highest for wine 4, and lowest for wine
1. This also holds when we consider the results per room. Looking at the mean
bids per wine, it appears that for all wines the bids were highest in room 2,
and lowest in room 3. The highest submitted bid was FFr1207. This bid was
submitted by a subject in room 2 for wine 4. However, this subject did not win
the wine, since the second highest bid was (just) below our reservation price.
The lowest bid was FFr0, and was submitted by two subjects: one for wine 1
8The questionnaires were carefully and completely filled in by all subjects, so there are no
missing observations for these variables, nor are there any missing values for the grades and
the bids.
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in room 2, and one for wine 2 in room 3. Two subjects won a wine during
the experiment. Both were in room 2. One subject won wine 1, and the other
wine 3. Note that the relatively low number of successful auctions (the ones
in which a wine was actually sold) is coherent with the findings of the Monte
Carlo exercise reported in the previous section. These findings suggest that so
few objects were sold because our reservation prices were too high.9
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 contains summary statistics for the ranks of the wines. For each
subject we assigned a rank to the wines on the basis of the subject’s grades. For
example, if a subject had graded the four wines with a 7, 8, 5 and 9 respectively,
the rank we assigned to the wines was 3, 2, 4 and 1 respectively. If there were
ties in the grades (for 44% of the subjects in the sample at least two grades
were tied), we also tied the corresponding ranks. For instance, if the two best
rated wines were tied, both wines were assigned a rank of 1.5. The conversion
from grades to ranks is useful for at least two reasons. Whereas the wine grades
assigned by an individual reflect her/his preferences, average grades such as
those reported in Table 2 do not necessarily reflect group preferences.10 Group
preferences can, however, be correctly inferred from the average ranks in Table
4. The issue is not that important in our data set though, since the ranking of
wines according to average grades and the ranking according to average ranks
lead to conflicting conclusions in room 2 only.
[Table 4 about here]
The second reason why the conversion is useful is that it allows us to apply
several tests based on rank statistics from which more can be learned about the
behavior of the subjects. Following Quandt (1998), we can test the hypothesis
that the subjects in a room judged a wine neither good nor bad. This null hy-
pothesis can be tested against the alternative hypothesis that the wine was good
or against the hypothesis that it was bad. The test consists in comparing the
sum (over all subjects in the room) of ranks of the wine with the critical value.
If the rank sum is greater (smaller) than the upper (lower) critical value, it can
be concluded that the wine was considered significantly good (bad). Similarly
as in Quandt we computed the critical values using Monte Carlo simulations.
We generated 5000 random rankings of four wines by m subjects,11 calculated
9When the Monte Carlo study is performed by assuming that the reservation prices have
means equal to the mean of the bids (for wine 1 and 2), the equilibrium bids are often above
the reservation prices, i.e. much more objects are sold under this configuration.
10Average grades do not necessarily reflect group preferences when there are scaling effects.
To see this, consider a simple example with two wines, evaluated by just two subjects. Suppose
the first subject grades wine 1 with a 10 and wine 2 with a 1, and that the second subject
grades the wines with a 9 and a 10. The resulting average scores for wine 1 and wine 2 are
9.5 and 5.5 respectively. Although the subjects have opposite preferences -the first subject
prefers wine 1 and the second subject wine 2- the average grades wrongly suggest that there
is a group preference for wine 1.
11Similarly as in Quandt the simulated ranks assigned by a subject were not allowed to be
tied.
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for each of the 5000 replications the rank sums of the four wines, and chose the
upper (lower) critical value at the α% level such that for α% of the replications
at least one rank sum was greater (smaller) than the chosen critical value. This
was done for m = 10, 11 and α = 5, 10. The test results are given in Table 5. In
room 1 the subjects judged wine 1 significantly bad at the 5% level; in the other
two rooms no wine was considered bad or good at that significance level. At
the 10% level two additional rank sums are significant: wine 3 was considered
good in room 1, and wine 4 was considered good in room 3.
[Table 5 about here]
We can also test the null hypothesis that the subjects in a room had ranked
the wines in a random way, i.e. that the average ranks observed in a room was
the result of pure random behavior. The alternative hypothesis is that the wines
were ranked in a non-random way. Quandt (1998) suggested to construct a test
on the basis of the statistic
D =
n∑
j=1
(
sj − m(n+ 1)2
)2
where n denotes the number of wines that were evaluated, m the number of
subjects, and sj the rank sum for wine j. It is not difficult to show that under
the null hypothesis the expected value of sj is m(n + 1)/2 for each j. Hence
the statistic D tends to be smaller when the null hypothesis is true than when
it is false, suggesting that a natural test is to reject the null hypothesis if D is
larger than some critical value. Again we resorted to Monte Carlo simulations
to determine the critical value. Using the same simulated samples as above,
we calculated D for each replication, and the critical value at the α% level was
set equal to the (1 − α%)-th quantile of the empirical distribution function of
the D’s. This was done for m = 10, 11 and α = 5, 10. As Table 5 indicates,
the only ranking that was significantly non-random at the 5% level was the one
in room 1. At the 10% level the rankings in rooms 1 and 3 were significantly
non-random.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the following bid-equation
Bidij = β1 +X
′
iβ2 + γj +Room1iθ1 +Room2iθ2 +Room3iθ3 + εij ,
i = 1, ..., 32, j = 1, ..., 4,
where Bidij is the bid submitted by subject i for wine j; β1, γj , θ1, θ2, and θ3 are
scalar parameters, and β2 is a vector of parameters; Xi is a vector containing the
socio-economic characteristics of subject i, and Room1i, Room2i and Room3i
are dummy variables indicating the room to which subject i was assigned; εij is
an error term. Normalizing γ1 = 0 and θ1 = 0, γ2, γ3 and γ4 represent the effects
of respectively wines 2, 3 and 4 on the expected willingness to pay relatively to
wine 1; θ2 and θ3 represent the effects of respectively Room2 and Room3 on the
expected willingness to pay relatively to Room1. Note that it is assumed that
the two treatment effects do not depend on the type of wine. Since for each
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possible pair of rooms the difference between mean submitted bids was more
or less the same for each wine (at least their signs were the same; see Table
3), this assumption seems reasonable. Note also that randomization ensures
that the error term is independent from the room indicators. Assuming that
the error term εij is i.i.d. over i and j, independent from Xi, and with mean
zero and variance σ2, the parameters were estimated by OLS estimation. When
other methods such as GLS random-effects estimation or ML random-effects
estimation were used, i.e. methods that allow the error terms for a subject to
be dependent random variables, the results were not fundamentally different.
The results are analyzed under the assumption that all bids submitted by the
subjects were equal to their willingness to pay for the wines, i.e. we assume that
the necessary conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied.
[Table 6 about here]
Let us first look at the estimation results for β2, the parameters associated
with the socio-economic variables. The estimates for Gender and Income are
significantly negative and are of the same order of magnitude: the willingness
to pay for wine is FFr115 less for women, and is FFr117 less for individuals
belonging to a high income-household. Since all subjects in the sample had a
job, i.e. all subjects disposed of a personal income, and since we control for
household income and the size of the household, it is likely that the estimate
for Gender reflects the pure intrinsic effect of being female on willingness to
pay. The coefficient associated with Consumption is significantly positive: the
willingness to pay is FFr132 more for individuals that regularly drink red wine
than for individuals that only drink sporadically. The coefficient estimates of
Age, Nationality, and Number of persons in household are not significant. The
result for Nationality is quite surprising, since it suggests that French individuals
value the Bordeaux wines and Burgundy wines similarly as individuals with
a different nationality. The coefficients for the three wine indicators are all
significant (although γ2 only at the 10% level) and positive, implying that wine
1 is valued less than the other three wines. F-tests indicate that wines 2 and 3
are equally valued; wines 3 and 4 are also equally valued and wine 2 is valued less
than wine 4. Now consider the estimation results for the parameters of primary
interest, i.e. the two treatment parameters. The coefficient for Room2 is positive
but not statistically different from zero. This implies that once individuals
have read the label characteristics and have consulted wine guides, the sensory
characteristics of the wine do not have an additional impact on their willingness
to pay. The coefficient for Room3 is significantly negative: if individuals who
have only tasted the wines blindly are informed about the label characteristics
and about the opinions of wine specialists, their willingness to pay increases on
average by FFr109.12
12Admittedly, the estimation of the bid-equation reported here is based on a relatively low
number of observations. To check whether any single observation had a disproportional effect
on the estimates, we performed the eyeball test suggested in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
pp. 32-33). The test does not suggest that there is an influential observation in our sample.
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5 Conclusion
This paper is based on an experimental auction during which four high-quality
wines (two Bordeaux and two Burgundy wines) were sold in four separate sealed
bid second-price auctions with secret reservation prices. This wine auction gen-
erated, for each individual, a set of socio-economic characteristics, four grades
and four submitted bids for the wines. These data allow us to show that certain
socio-economic variables such as gender, income and consumption habits, have
a significant impact on the willingness to pay for wine, while others such as age
and nationality do not. The data also allow us to establish how the willingness
to pay differs with the degree of information that is available to the consumer.
The sensory characteristics of the wine do not have a significant impact on the
willingness to pay of individuals who have read the label of the bottle and the
additional information. Conversely, the willingness to pay of individuals who
have tasted the wines blindly increases significantly when they are informed
about the label characteristics and the additional information.
The consumer’s willingness to pay for wine is thus more closely related to
the information reported on the label of the bottle and in wine guides than
to the taste of the wine. More precisely, it seems that the description pro-
vided by the label and the experts outclasses the information that a typical
consumer can gather through a simple blind-tasting. A possible explanation
for this result could be the following. Basically, wine can be considered as a
bundle of characteristics or attributes. Some of these characteristics are search
attributes and some others are experience attributes.13 The former, the label
characteristics, can be evaluated by the consumers before they buy the wine, by
examining and researching the product. The latter, the sensory characteristics,
are attributes that consumers cannot assess until they buy and taste the wine.
However, it is difficult for non experts to perceive the sensory characteristics
and more generally to determine accurately the quality of a wine. This is es-
pecially true for young wines, as those used in our experiment, the quality of
which can be expected to be underestimated. A simple way for consumers to be
informed about the quality of a wine is then to consider the label characteristics
as quality indicators or to read the opinions of wine specialists. Actually, wine
guides and labels provide the consumers an information about quality that is
respectively better and easier to identify than the one they can obtain through
their own tasting of the product. Therefore, tasting a wine after reading the
label of the bottle and the experts’ opinions does not bring any additional in-
formation on the product and thus does not alter the willingness of consumers
to pay. But reading these opinions and the label after the tasting of the wine
gives the consumers an information that they are not able to get through their
own evaluation, explaining then the revision (the increase in the case of young
wines) of their willingness to pay.
It would be interesting to see if the conclusions of this study are confirmed
using a larger population and other types of wines (more mature wines, less
13See Nelson (1970, 1974) for the distinction between search and experience goods, and
Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) for its application to product characteristics.
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expensive wines, other wine regions, etc.). Another topic for further research is
to announce information on prices such as the retail price in the experiment.
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Table 2
Grades on a 0-10 scale: mean (std. dev.)
Wine Room 1 Room 2 Room 3 Total sample
1 4.30 (1.64) 6.82 (1.25) 5.18 (1.72) 5.47 (1.83)
2 6.50 (1.43) 7.00 (1.48) 5.00 (2.19) 6.16 (1.90)
3 7.70 (1.06) 6.55 (1.29) 6.09 (1.38) 6.75 (1.39)
4 7.10 (1.73) 7.18 (1.99) 6.91 (1.22) 7.06 (1.63)
Table 3
Bids for a lot of 6 bottles in FFr: mean (std. dev.)
Wine Room 1 Room 2 Room 3 Total sample
1 152 (109) 266 (301) 145 (101) 189 (198)
2 292 (198) 310 (126) 199 (203) 266 (180)
3 308 (116) 404 (188) 216 (88) 310 (156)
4 356 (258) 467 (319) 243 (93) 356 (253)
Table 4
Ranks of wines: mean (std. dev.)
Wine Room 1 Room 2 Room 3 Total sample
1 3.95 (0.16) 2.45 (1.08) 2.86 (1.03) 3.06 (1.06)
2 2.55 (0.64) 2.23 (1.01) 3.00 (1.18) 2.59 (1.00)
3 1.70 (0.79) 2.95 (0.91) 2.41 (0.97) 2.38 (1.01)
4 1.80 (0.82) 2.36 (1.32) 1.72 (0.88) 1.97 (1.05)
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Table 5
Rank sums and the D-statistic
Wine Room 1 Room 2 Room 3
1 39.5−− 27 31.5
2 25.5 24.5 33
3 17+ 32.5 26.5
4 18 26 19+
D 323.5∗∗ (122;100) 36.5 (140;115) 119.5∗ (140;115)
Notes: Significance levels for the rank sums were computed using Monte Carlo
simulations. In room 1 (10 subjects and 4 wines), the critical lower (upper) value at
the 5% level is equal to 17 (33); at the 10% level the lower (upper) value equals 18
(32). In rooms 2 and 3 (11 subjects and 4 wines), the lower (upper) value at the 5%
level is 19 (36), and at the 10% level 20 (35). ++ (−−) indicates a significantly good
(bad) wine at the 5% level; + (−) indicates a significantly good (bad) wine at the
10% level. Critical levels for D were also computed using Monte Carlo simulations
and are given in parentheses (5%;10%). ∗∗ (∗) indicates a significant value for D at
the 5% (10%) level.
Table 6
OLS results for the bid equation
Variable Estimate T-statistic
Constant (β1) 219.95 2.34
Gender -115.37 -2.93
Age -1.12 -0.69
Nationality 16.62 0.45
Income -117.10 -3.25
Number of persons in household 7.52 0.48
Consumption 131.85 3.53
Wine2 (γ2) 77.19 1.77
Wine3 (γ3) 120.25 2.76
Wine4 (γ4) 166.41 3.82
Room2 (θ2) 46.77 1.06
Room3 (θ3) -109.36 -2.70
Number of observations 128
σ 174.26
Adjusted R2 0.29
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Appendix 1: Letter to participants
(the letter was the same in the three rooms except where indicated)
Œ N O M E T R I C S - 6th Conference
An Experimental Wine Auction
Ajaccio, 2 October 1998
Dear colleague,
In a short while an experimental wine auction will take place in this conference room. The aim of this experiment is to
analyze the impact of information on the formation of auction prices. The purpose of this letter is to inform you about the
conditions under which the experiment will be held.
There are several conference rooms, and each person attending this conference has been randomly assigned to one of them.
In each room the experimental conditions will be slightly different.
Room 1.
You have been assigned to room 1. In room 1 the experiment will start with an evaluation of four different wines. You
will get the opportunity to taste the four wines, and read the label of the bottles as well as some additional information
concerning the products.
Room 2.
You have been assigned to room 2. In room 2 the experiment will start with an evaluation of four different wines. You
will only get the opportunity to read the label of the bottles as well as some additional information concerning the
products.
Room 3.
You have been assigned to room 3. In room 3 the experiment will start with an evaluation of four different wines. You
will only get the opportunity to taste blindly the four wines.
You will be asked to grade each wine on a scale from 0 to 10, and report the grade on a form. On this form you will also be
asked to answer a number of questions about your wine consumption habits, and some questions about your socio-economic
characteristics (more precisely, we will ask you your age, your gender, your nationality, the size of your household, and your
household income).
The four wines will then be sold (per lot of six bottles) at a so-called second-price sealed bid auction (also known as a
Vickrey auction).
Room 1.
The wines will be auctioned successively, and you will only compete with participants in room 1.
Room 2.
The wines will be auctioned successively, and you will only compete with participants in room 2.
Room 3.
The wines will be auctioned successively, and you will only compete with participants in room 3.
For each wine, you will be requested to submit a bid in an envelope. The wine will only be sold if the second highest bid
exceeds or equals a secret reservation price fixed by us. If that is the case, the participant with the highest bid will win the
wine and will pay a price equal to the second highest bid.
We guarantee that all information obtained in this experiment will remain strictly confidential at all times. That is, if you
decide to participate in the experiment, your bids and the information concerning your wine consumption habits and socio-
economic characteristics will not be revealed to the other participants of the conference, nor will it be possible to identify you
in whatever way from future publications based on the experimental data set.
If you accept the above conditions and if you are willing to participate in the experiment, we ask you to sign this letter.
                                                                                                                                            ................................................
                                                                                                                                                 (first name and surname)
                                                                                                                                            ................................................
                                                                                                                                                          (signature)
Appendix 2: Instructions for participants
(instructions were the same in the three rooms except where indicated)
First we will ask you a number of questions concerning your socio-economic characteristics and your wine consumption
habits. Please find (among the material that was included in the big envelope) the questionnaire form, and answer the
questions in parts A and B (do not answer the questions in part C yet).
Now that you have answered the questions in parts A and B, we will turn to the evaluation of the four wines.
Room 1.
Please find the four wine description forms. Each form is numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4, and contains a photo of the label of the
wine bottle as well as some additional information concerning the product. Please look at each form carefully. After you
have read the wine descriptions, you will be served four cups of wine. Each cup is numbered, again between 1 and 4.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between cups and wine descriptions, i.e. the wine in say cup j corresponds to the
wine described in form j. Please taste each wine… You will now be required to grade each wine in view of its
description form and its taste.
Room 2.
You will get the opportunity to read the label of the wine bottles as well as some additional information concerning the
products, but you will not be able to actually taste the wines. Please find the four wine description forms. Each form is
numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4, and contains a photo of the label of the wine bottle plus the additional information. Please look at
each form carefully… You will now be required to grade each wine in view of its description form.
Room 3.
You will be able to taste the wines, but you will not get the opportunity to read the label of the wine bottles nor any other
information concerning the products. You will be served four cups of wine. Each cup is numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4. Please
taste each wine… You will now be required to grade each wine in view of its taste.
Please grade each wine on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good), and report all grades in part C of the questionnaire
form. Since the questionaire forms will now be collected, we advise you to copy your grades on a separate piece of paper, as
they might be useful in determining your bids for the wines later on.
The wines you have just evaluated will be auctioned separately, first we will auction wine 1, then wine 2, etc... Each wine
will be sold, per lot of six bottles, at a Vickrey auction with a secret reservation price fixed by us. According to this auction
mechanism, a wine will only be sold if the second highest bid is equal to or larger than the secret reservation price. If that is
the case, the participant with the highest submitted bid will win the wine, and will pay a price equal to the second highest bid.
(Example 1: suppose there are four participants with bids equal to 50, 30, 70 and 60 respectively, and suppose the reservation
price is 40, then participant three wins and pays a price equal to 60. Example 2: suppose there are four participants with bids
equal to 70, 80, 20 and 110 respectively, and suppose the reservation price is 90, then nobody wins the auction since the
reservation price exceeds the second highest bid.)
The winner of an auction will pay the winning price to us. The bottles of wine will be sent to her/his home address without
any additional charges.
The reservation prices are equal to the wholesale prices of the wines. The reservation prices are included in the four
envelopes I show you now, but they will be kept secret during the experiment. At the end of the session you can, if you wish,
consult the envelopes and read our reservation prices.
You will be able to submit your bid for a particular wine by picking the appropriate small envelope (there are four of them,
each one numbered between 1 and 4), by indicating on the included piece of paper your bid, and by reinserting the piece of
paper in the small envelope (please do not close it). Remember that your bid will be for a lot of 6 bottles, and should be in
French francs. Remember also that you will only compete with the participants in this room.
As mentioned already, the wines will be auctioned successively, one after the other. Once all bids for a particular wine are
submitted, we will collect the envelopes and compare the bids. If there is no winner, we will directly move on to the next
auction round. If there is one, I will announce the winner’s identification number, ask the winner to come to me and reveal
her/his name, and then we will continue with the next round. In case the highest bid is submitted by two or more participants
simultaneously (and if at the same time the second highest bid is equal to or larger than the reservation price), we will select
the winner at random among these participants.
You will now have the opportunity to read the instructions on your own and ask questions. Once there are no more questions,
we will proceed with the sale by auction of wine 1.
Please submit your bid for wine 1.
Appendix 3: Questionnaire
A. Socio-economic questions
1. What is your gender?
M F
2. What is your nationality?
.................................................
3. What is your age?
...................
4. How many people live in your household?
...................
5. What is your monthly net (after taxes) household income in French francs?
0-5000 5000-10000 10000-15000
15000-20000 20000-25000 25000-30000
30000-40000 40000-50000 50000-75000
75000-100000 > 100000
B. Consumption habits
6.  Do you drink red wine?
Yes No
7.  If yes, with which frequency?
Once per month
Once per week
Several times per week
Each day
C. Wine evaluation
8.  How do you grade each wine on a 0-10 scale?
Wine 1 ...........
Wine 2 ...........
Wine 3 ...........
Wine 4 ...........
Appendix 4: Wine description forms
Description wine 1
Beaune, a small village of 23 000 inhabitants, is the wine capital of Burgundy and is well known for its cellars and ‘‘Hôtel
Dieu’’. The vineyard of Beaune stretches over a large band (of 1 000 to 2 000 metres) on gentle slopes (230 to 300 meters
high). Added to its location, its latitude makes it one of the most early-ripening vineyards of the Côte d’Or. The soils, which
are composed of brown limestone irregularly mixed with clay and sand, have an influence on the variety of the terroirs. One
finds a range of wines going from supple and fine wines to firm and structured wines with a good ageing potential (Les 1er
Crus du vignoble de Beaune, 1998).
‘‘L’appellation’’ Beaune counts 28 ‘‘Premiers crus’’ and 8 others that are only partially on its territory (total surface of
Beaune region is 322 acres). Some of them - Les Epenottes, Le Clos des Mouches, Les Cent Vignes or Les Bressandes -
actually deserve a revalorization of their ranking (Bradfer, de Clouet, and Maratier, 1992). [Remark: ‘‘Appellations Premier
cru’’ and ‘‘Grand cru’’ implies not only that the wines are of quality, but also that they are produced on a well demarcated
parcel (‘‘un climat’’). Often the parcels are exploited by several wine producers with similar production methods.]
Domain Cauvard is a family property (3rd generation) that exploits 16.5 acres in Côtes de Beaune. Traditional methods are
used together with new oenology-techniques ensuring a constant level of production and quality. Cauvard is one of the 10
principal owners of Bressandes, and exploits other ‘‘appellations Premier cru’’: Beaune Cent Vignes and Beaune Teurons,
and an ‘‘appellation Grand cru’’ (a white wine): Corton Charlemagne (publicity of the owner).
Grape variety: Pinot noir. Time spent in cask: 12 months. Average age of vine: 50 years. Maturation period: 5 to 10 years,
depending on the vintage.
The structure of the exploitations in the Côtes de Beaune is characterized by a multiplicity of small parcels, and by the fact
that wine owners produce small quantities of wine. The procedures associated with referring in guides are then cumbersome
and expensive, implying that for many producers there is no strong incentive to appear in them. It is the case for wine 1, for
which no guide appreciations exist.
Description wine 2
The vineyards of Nuits-Saint-Georges are located on the hill and the Piedmont. The total surface is 315 acres, of which 125
are Hautes Côtes de Nuits. The domain Hospices de Nuits-Saint-Georges was assembled over the years through bequests
given by families living in the region. Nowadays, it stretches out over an area of 11.3 acres in the municipalities of Nuits-St-
Georges, Prémaux-prissey and Vosne-Romanée. The wines are kept at the Hospices in new casks to guarantee quality; the
whole wine production is bottled in the region (booklet Hospices de Nuits-St-Georges).
Les Fleurières is situated south of Nuits-Saint Georges, at the foot of the hill. The 1995 vintage of Les Fleurières has been
sold at auction (charity sale) in March 1996. The buyers were Maison Liger-Belair, Maisons Jean-Luc Aergerter (Nuit-Saint-
Georges) Bouchard Aîné France (Nuits-Saint-Georges), Gall (The Netherlands), Maison Charles Viennot (Nuit-Saint-
Georges) in company with Maison Orange et Co (Jersey, Guernesey) and Jean-Claude Boisset Vins (Bienne, Suisse), and
Weinkellerei Karl Weber (Cologne, Allemagne) (local journal , March 1996).
Production of Fleurières des Hospices: 8 to 11 ‘‘pièces’’ (of 228 liters each, or 300 bottles) depending on the vintage. Grape
variety: Pinot noir. Vineyard: 9.5 acres. Time spent in cask: 18 to 20 months. Average age of vine: 40 years. Maturation
period: 8 to 15 years for the 1995 vintage. Ranking: ‘‘Appellation Nuits-Saint-Georges Village’’.
The structure of the exploitations in the Côtes de Nuits is characterized by a multiplicity of small parcels, and by the fact that
wine owners produce small quantities of wine. The procedures associated with referring in guides are then cumbersome and
expensive, implying that for many producers there is no strong incentive to appear in them. It is the case for wine 2, for
which no guide appreciations exist.
Description wine 3
Production: 48 000 bottles. Grape variety: Merlot (75%); Cabernet sauvignon (15%); Cabernet franc (10%). Vineyard: 8.5
acres. Time spent in cask: 20 months. Average age of vine: 30 ans. Maturation period: 4 to 12 years, depending on the
vintage. Ranking: ‘‘Grand cru classé’’.
If there is one name which is known since centuries in Saint-Emilion, then it is definitely Berliquet. It was mentioned on very
old geographical maps, and since 1767 Berliquet is considered as one of the most highly esteemed Saint-Emilion wines. The
wine broker Paguierre, in his ‘‘Classification et Description des Vins de Bordeaux’’ published in 1829, indicated that the top
Saint-Emilion wines were Canole, Berliquet, l’abbé Desèze, Laborie and Fontemoing. [...] This château has always put much
effort in the improvement and renewing of its vineyard. Very recently the owners have installed a modern vat, allowing the
alliance of the most recent production techniques and traditional vinification methods. The grapes harvest, on average forty
barrels, matures in old casks, which are located under the château. Visiting these installations is not only majestically
beautiful, but also allows one to realize how carefully the owners and those who actually produce the wines look after the
place: their common and only concern is to please their highly demanding French and foreign customers. Château Berliquet
is a member of ‘‘les vins de Bordeaux’’ (publicity of the owner).
This property has superb cellars, is remarkably situated and is very well exposed at the outskirts of Saint-Emilion. In 1985,
Berliquet was the only chateau to be promoted ‘‘grand cru classé’’. Its reputation, however, seems to have been even greater
in the XVIII-th century; in a manuscript dating from 1794, a courier from Libourne praised the excellent quality of this Saint-
Emilion wine. However, the domain has remained somewhat in the dark until 1978: the wines were then produced and
distributed by the enormous cooperative of the city. Since then, the wine production and bottling take place at the château.
[...] Estimation of its current rank: equivalent to a ‘‘cru bourgeois de Médoc’’ (Robert Parker, 1993).
The vineyard of château Berliquet stretches out over the famous Madelaine plateau. It neighbours those of châteaux Canon
and Magdelaine. This privileged location and magnificent exposition give the wines a bouquet and a finesse, thanks to which
château Berliquet has won the highest awards in the previous century (Claude Ferret, 1974).
1995
1995
Description wine 4
Production:  240 000 bottles.  Grape variety: Merlot (50%); Cabernet sauvignon (40%); Cabernet franc (10%). Vineyard: 40
acres. Time spent in cask: 18 months. Average age of vine: 30 years. Maturation period: 3 to 15 years, depending on the
vintage. Ranking: ‘‘Cru bourgeois’’.
Château Haut-Marbuzet figures on the menus of the best restaurants in Europe; it has more than 20 000 regular clients,
among who the presidency of the French republic, the Prime Minister’s office (‘‘l’hôtel Matignon’’), the European
parliament, the national assembly, the senate, several ministries, and many well known national and international
personalities (publicity of the owner).
Haut-Marbuzet is one of the oldest properties in Saint-Estèphe, but it remained relatively unknown until 1952, when it was
bought by the father of the actual owner, Henri Dubosq. [...] The vineyard is excellently situated, facing the valley of the
Gironde on a gentle slope. Dubosq produces a bordeaux which is among the most sought after, particularly in France, in
Belgium, in The Netherlands and in the UK (these four countries absorb the largest part of the production). He is a supporter
of harvesting relatively late, so that the grapes are very ripe when gathered. He lets the grapes macerate for at least 3 weeks,
and all his wines mature in casks made of new oak for a period of 18 months; these methods give rise to a wine that is very
fruity, opulent and full, with a rich, exotic and spicy bouquet. For wine lovers, Haut-Marbuzet is not only one of the
‘‘easiest’’,  but also one of the most sensual wines of the Bordeaux region. This bordeaux has a character a bit similar to a
burgundy wine or a voluptuous côtes-du-rhône. [...] Estimation of its current rank : should be promoted ‘‘troisième grand cru
classé’’ (Robert Parker, 1993).
The best of many good St-Estèphe crus bourgeois. New oak gives Haut-Marbuzet a classic style (Hugh Johnson, 1995).
Henri Dubosq, magician of wine, has always set the pace in the Médoc. One of the first bourgeois to use casks made of new
oak for the entire wine production, he has succeeded in producing a very fashionable wine. [...]. In 1985 this wine has won
the ‘‘Coupe des crus bourgeois’’ (Bradfer, de Clouet, and Maratier, 1992).
